Three lessons from England’s knockout defeats under Gareth Southgate

One of the myriad challenges for an England manager is that there are millions of people who believe they could do a better job. Put them in charge, these aspirant coaches claim, and the Three Lions’ array of attacking talent would be unleashed to devastating effect. The plan usually amounts to: “Just run at ’em.”

As we have seen in recent weeks, major international tournaments are in reality a little more complicated. Those now questioning Gareth Southgate’s abilities might consider the pre-tournament narrative, which virtually amounted to: “Who will England play in the final?” In that sense he has clearly become a victim of his own success. But the England manager has at times faced valid criticism. His decisions are scrutinised endlessly, and although they are based on multifarious factors, taking in unseen information from behind the scenes as well as detailed analytical data, there are some trends apparent to the more casual viewer – or amateur coach. What can be learned by refreshing the memory and rewatching his side’s three major tournament departures: against Croatia in 2018, Italy in 2021 and France in 2022?

Related: Euro 2024 team guides part 10: England

Croatia v England,

2018 World Cup semi-final

Croatia (4-5-1) England (3-5-2)

First, England’s advertised 3-5-2 is misleading. Playing with wing-backs is positive on paper but in reality England use more a 5-3-2: a back five with Croatia in possession, which is more than England (56% v 44%). For an hour this negates the threat of Luka Modric, Ivan Rakitic and co, while Raheem Sterling and Harry Kane cause problems for Zlatko Dalic’s side. But England’s early goal by Kieran Trippier originates from a speculative long ball and they never dominate possession or territory: the plan is containment and counterattack.

After the 2-1 extra-time defeat Southgate is criticised for persisting with a front two when England were outnumbered in midfield. But against players such as Modric and Rakitic, it is too simplistic to say swapping a forward for a midfielder would have wrestled back control of a game that drifts away from England. What is clear is the influence of the starting midfielders – Jordan Henderson, Jesse Lingard and Dele Alli – wanes badly after half-time.

Worrying spaces open up. On 65 minutes Modric, for the first time, is allowed to turn and run at England’s central defence. Despite the toils of Henderson, Lingard and Dele, entrusted with a heavy workload against Croatia’s midfield five, Southgate’s first change in this area comes on 97 minutes when Eric Dier replaces an exhausted Henderson (Marcus Rashford and Danny Rose are already on). Dier’s freshness makes an immediate impact.

Dalic makes no substitutions until five minutes into extra time, and even then his hand is forced by an injury to Ivan Strinic. This illustrates the most unexpected facet of the game: Croatia have played 120 minutes in their previous two knockout ties, and are older on average, but they look fitter and fresher and appear to grow stronger as the minutes tick by.

Did England’s fifth-minute opener somehow leave them emotionally drained, or are Croatia just better conditioned? Southgate can realistically do little about either factor from the touchline, aside from bringing reinforcements from the bench. The energy of Kane, England’s creative linchpin, evaporates along with that of the starting midfield three.

We cannot know if earlier England substitutions or a change in formation would have led to a better outcome. For all the captain’s qualities, it appears replacing a tiring Kane along with Sterling would have been a positive option.

And if Ruben Loftus-Cheek merited a place on the bench, why not allow him to inject dynamism into a struggling midfield?

Italy v England, Euro 2020 final

Italy (4-3-3) England (3-4-2-1)

Early in extra time, England’s problem appears straightforward. Roberto Mancini has introduced five substitutes while England have made two changes, with Bukayo Saka and Jordan Henderson introduced for Kieran Trippier and Declan Rice. Bryan Cristante, Domenico Berardi, Federico Bernardeschi, Andrea Belotti and Manuel Locatelli are hard-running midfielders/forwards and they have a decisive effect.

The unfussy Cristante, introduced with Berardi in a double change on 54 minutes, becomes the most influential player. He wins the flick-on for the Azzurri’s 67th-minute equaliser and his every action is telling – hurrying England in possession or stretching their defence with direct running. In the 120th minute he wins another near-post header from a corner but directs it wide.

Southgate would argue he did not enjoy the same squad depth, so similar substitutions were not possible. But in extra time Kane appears so fatigued he can barely run. He makes token attempts to press defenders, meaning they can easily pick passes into Marco Verratti and Jorginho in midfield. Italy’s fresher legs ensure England have no such luxury of time on the ball, and the wisdom of Southgate’s decision to withdraw Declan Rice rather than Kalvin Phillips is debatable. Jude Bellingham, meanwhile, remains on the bench.

A deep tournament run arguably means substitutions become exponentially more important in later rounds as physical and mental tiredness increases. Speaking to uefa.com last year, Mancini explained his liberal use of substitutes. “It was important for everyone because the players had all just come off the end of an exhausting season,” he said. “The guys who came off the bench knew what to do … When a tired player came off, a fresh player came on with a desire to improve the team.”

Although it can be difficult to sacrifice Kane’s many qualities mid-game, including his penalty-taking ability before a potential shootout, the second-half introduction of Dominic Calvert-Lewin would surely have given Mancini something to think about. The physical toll on Kane caused by muscular treatment from Giorgio Chiellini and Leonardo Bonucci may also have been considered. And how long can tolerating a tiring Kane, with one eye on penalties, be justified? On 94 minutes, Saka’s pace isolates Chiellini and draws the cynical foul to launch a thousand memes. Should Italy’s ageing central defenders have been exposed to express pace more often as an attritional encounter wore on?

France v England, 2022 World Cup quarter-final

France (4-2-3-1) England (4-3-3)

Of three major tournament defeats under Southgate this is comfortably the most dynamic and positive performance. The outstanding Saka is a constant menace and some questionable refereeing means France frequently escape punishment, notably when the Arsenal winger is roughed up by Dayot Upamecano before the France counterattack that brings Aurélien Tchouaméni’s opener.

Les Bleus start stronger but Kane’s playmaking is key as England grow into the game, and they finish with 58% possession and eight shots on target to France’s five. Playing 4-3-3, Southgate’s side are far more open at the back than against Croatia four years before. But this can only be a good thing when it allows Saka, Bellingham and Phil Foden to get forward. In just 90 minutes England muster more on-target efforts than in the extra-time encounters against Croatia and Italy combined.

It’s a game of fine margins and there is no accounting for Kane’s late penalty miss in a 2-1 defeat. Southgate makes four substitutions to one by Didier Deschamps – although the 98th-minute introduction of Jack Grealish surely comes too late.

England are a skied spot-kick away from forcing extra time against the world champions. Against Croatia and Italy, England searched in vain for that difficult second goal, with both matches seemingly allowed to drift. Arguably too much was expected of the starting XI, especially at Wembley against the Azzurri.

But England’s positivity against France meant they left Qatar with no regrets. Will Southgate fully trust his bench in the knockouts in Germany? “We have a squad and we need to use it,” Southgate said after the opening win against Serbia, so the signs are good. And if in doubt, just run at ’em.