How each of traditional ‘big six’ press – and why Man Utd are useless at it

It was once known as plain old closing down, but coordinated pressing schemes have become one of the key tactical battlegrounds at the sharp end of the Premier League.

How a team performs out of possession is regarded as a barometer for judging their manager or head coach. If a team short of elite attacking talent struggles to score goals, a coach will get some sympathy and understanding. If a team looks a structural mess against the ball, as Erik ten Hag and Manchester United have discovered this season, searching questions will soon be asked.

Pressing is not always about winning the ball off the opposition in their defensive third. It can be about blocking up passing lanes by keeping potential recipients in your shadow, or shepherding opponents to their less dangerous flank of the pitch. Keeping them away from their strengths, and funnelling them towards yours.

Effective pressing does not necessarily make highlight reels, or even result in an on-pitch event that is recorded statistically. Often it is about preventing moments of danger you never get to see, which can make it hard to pin down.

A simple definition of pressing is how a team organises itself when the opponent has settled possession. They can be deep or high up the pitch. This is not the same as ‘counter-pressing’, beloved by Jürgen Klopp, which is how a team tries to regain the ball seconds after losing it.

Here, Telegraph Sport focuses on the former and how each of the ‘big six’ clubs approaches this side of the game. There are many shared principles but also some telling differences.

Arsenal’s strategy: 4-4-2 ‘hybrid’ press

Mikel Arteta’s team have stifled opponents for most of the season with a 4-4-2 shape that flips from a zonal to man-to-man approach after a certain trigger. This is usually led by captain Martin Odegaard, who shifts from screening passes into midfield to ‘jumping’ on to the opponent’s left centre-back, which prompts Declan Rice to jump to the holding midfielder. A fine example of this came in Arsenal’s dominant win over Liverpool, when Arsenal had a clear plan to stop Virgil van Dijk opening up on his right foot and encouraged passes to the right-footed Joe Gomez at left-back. February’s victory over Newcastle was also a ferocious pressing display, winning the ball 14 times in the attacking third.

Strengths: Aggressive man to man pressure but can quickly collapse into a low block

Arsenal lead the league for high turnovers resulting in shots with 2.1 per 90 minutes. This is partly a function of personnel with Odegaard, Rice, Kai Havertz, Gabriel Martinelli and Bukayo Saka all outstanding ‘defensive’ attackers. Arsenal’s edge over other teams though, has been how quick they are to recover into a more passive but compact 4-4-2 shape if the press is broken.

This is something PSV Eindhoven manager Peter Bosz noticed, saying his team tried to emulate Arsenal’s approach in their own games following a 4-0 defeat at the Emirates in the Champions League. “Afterwards, I thought, ‘We played pretty well… but we lost 4-0?’,” Bosz told The Athletic. “The answer is that they are outstanding in the opposition box but also their own. They get a lot of players behind the ball as soon as possible. They do it with 10 or 11 but we only did it with six or seven and then the distances are bigger.”

Weaknesses: Rice and Odegaard asked to do two jobs

In recent weeks, Porto, Bayern Munich and Aston Villa have enjoyed some success by splitting their two centre-backs wide to increase the distances for Odegaard to cover, which in turn increases the workload on Declan Rice. Goalkeepers Emiliano Martínez and Manuel Neuer were extremely composed as the spare player against Arsenal’s front two, while left centre-backs Pau Torres and Eric Dier were able to distribute with precision. With Rice dragged away from the centre of the pitch, Arsenal have found themselves in more transition games which is precisely what Arteta wants to avoid. This Bayern move was a good example of Arsenal getting stretched in a way we have seldom seen.

Chelsea’s strategy: Mid-block with occasional high pressing

Against weaker opponents, Chelsea have felt emboldened to press higher up the pitch, but Mauricio Pochettino’s team look at their most effective when settling into a mid-block. This defensive strategy is football’s equivalent of the half-court press, allowing opponents comfortable possession in their own half before applying pressure once they progress beyond the halfway line.

In Chelsea’s FA Cup semi-final against Manchester City, we saw Pochettino’s team settle into a 4-4-2 shape, allowing City possession at the back and keeping defensive and midfield lines tight. Matches against City are different tactical assignments from most fixtures, but Chelsea rank seventh for high turnovers and seventh for passes per defensive action across the season. They are not yet in the mould of Pochettino’s Spurs.

Strengths: Creates space for pacy attackers

Chelsea’s better moments have come against higher quality opponents, with their mid-block tempting teams on to them before breaking at speed. A more aggressive high press might lead to Chelsea being camped in the opponent’s defensive third, but they have frequently looked quite blunt in such scenarios. Chelsea are still reliant on Thiago Silva in the central defence, and a more conservative approach out of possession suits the 39-year-old, who wants to see the game in front of him.

Weaknesses: Space between two central midfielders

Defending in a mid-block should make it difficult for teams to fire forward passes into central areas, but Chelsea midfielders Enzo Fernández and Moises Caicedo have found themselves split apart far too often. The move did not result in any danger, but this pass from Everton’s James Tarkowski is symptomatic of the problem.

In the build-up to Arsenal’s opening goal against Chelsea in Tuesday’s 5-0 victory, it was too easy for Saka to pass between Caicedo and Fernandez into the feet of Havertz, and from there Arsenal played to the spare men on the far side.

Liverpool’s strategy: Harrying, 4-3-3 with forwards narrow

Klopp’s Liverpool have been defined by pressing and counter-pressing, with a sign at their Melwood training ground reading “intensity is our identity.” Liverpool press with a narrow front three, with their inside forwards ready to jump and pressure opposition centre-backs. Depending on the opponent, Liverpool’s nominal No 9 will sometimes drop into a deeper position to screen passes in the opposition holding midfielder. Liverpool do not just want to hold opponents at arm’s length; they want to harass and harry.

As Klopp’s assistant Pep Lijnders told the Coaches’ Voice in 2022: “80 per cent of teams in modern football press but for me pressing and chasing is [sic] two completely different things. We chase. Our idea of pressing is not to force them one way, or force bad passes. Our pressing is to steal the ball.”

Strengths: Forwards close to goal, hard to play through centrally

Liverpool remain one of the best teams in the league at disrupting their opponent’s possession. Liverpool’s opponents have recorded an average pass completion of 76.94 per cent this season, lower than against any team. Along with Tottenham, Liverpool’s passes per defensive action is a league-low at 8.8, meaning they allow teams fewer passes before making a defensive intervention. Liverpool’s narrow shape remains extremely difficult to penetrate centrally, with the front three and midfield forming a block of six. When possession is regained, the shape also puts Liverpool’s forwards closer to goal for counter-attacks.

Weaknesses: Defending the wide channels

At their best Liverpool were excellent at using the touchline as their friend and pinning teams to one side. The teams who cause Liverpool problems are those who can circulate the ball from one flank to another, exploiting the wing Liverpool have left under-manned.

As is no secret, teams have enjoyed success switching play to the left over the head of Trent Alexander-Arnold. Despite some strong performances from Wataru Endo, Liverpool’s lack of a high-grade No 6 has also left their centre-backs exposed at times, with physical forwards such as Havertz and Dominic Calvert-Lewin dragging Ibrahima Konate and Virgil van Dijk out of position.

Manchester City’s strategy: Waves of pressing

Pep Guardiola’s team are very flexible in their pressing shape, making subtle tweaks from week to week depending on the opposition. Generally though, City defend in either a 4-1-4-1 or a 4-4-2 shape and look to hound opponents aggressively high up the pitch. With Kevin De Bruyne’s delicate hamstrings, and Erling Haaland not a natural presser, City pick their moments more than a few seasons ago, as they manage fatigue and games in multiple competitions. City’s press still produces chances, winning more high turnovers per game than any team. Interestingly, City rank ninth for passes per defensive action this season and opponents complete passes at a marginally higher rate against City than they do against Liverpool, Arsenal or Spurs. City are being more passive for longer spells.

Strengths: Suffocating teams, guarding the half-spaces

City remain very compact from front to back, and their pressing system goes hand-in-hand with the fact they keep possession so well, moving up the pitch slowly with shorter passes so the team remains connected. Another strength of City’s shape is the narrow positions of the wingers when asked to defend, blocking off the half-spaces – those inside channels that are between the wing and the centre of the pitch. City will happily leave full-backs unmarked to ensure these avenues are closed off.

Weaknesses: Direct balls over the top

There are very few weaknesses in City’s press, but long, straight balls have caused them headaches this season, notably at Brentford and in the early stages of the Manchester derby at the Etihad. If City’s other two central midfielders can be tempted forward, then there can be space to exploit either side of Rodri, who has to manage the middle of the park on his own at times. When Guardiola uses centre-back John Stones in central midfield zones, there can also be moments where City are vulnerable as he transitions between the positions.

Manchester United’s strategy: Narrow press with occasional man-marking

Erik ten Hag mostly deployed a 4-3-3 pressing shape last season, but as he tries to plug holes in the United boat he has used a narrow 4-4-2 shape this season. There is less of the strict man-marking in midfield, but United do use this approach at times.

Earlier in the season, United ranked highly for high turnovers and pressures in the final third. Their first-half away at Spurs in August, in which they failed to convert several big chances, was something of a blueprint for what Ten Hag wants. Despite United’s defensive problems, Ten Hag has insisted on his forwards pressing high all season, with wingers pushed on to opposition centre-backs.

Strengths: Capable of winning the ball in dangerous positions

The potential benefits of United’s approach have not come to fruition, but on the occasions when they do increase their intensity and their back four is more aggressive, it can lead to dangerous transition chances. The 2-1 victory over Chelsea at Old Trafford in December, when United amassed more than four expected goals, is what they can produce when the high-wire act pays off.

Weaknesses: Defenders not pushing up, full-backs staying deep, lots of space

All season long, United have been stretched from front to back, with teams passing or running through the oceans of space left in central midfield. United’s defenders are scared to pinch up, wary of their lack of athleticism being exposed. This sequence of play against Brentford is a good example. United’s forwards are high and narrow, with right-winger Garnacho pressing the central centre-back in Brentford’s back three.

Brentford’s goalkeeper Mark Flekken plays a simple pass to Nathan Collins, who has 30 yards to run into because Keane Lewis-Potter has pinned Diogo Dalot. United’s full-back did not feel he step in and ask his centre-back to cover wide. McTominay tries to recover to Collins, Kobbie Mainoo man-marks Yegor Yarmolyuk, with a crater opening up in United’s midfield. Yoanne Wissa received the pass in a dangerous position before Ivan Toney hit the post.

Tottenham Hotspur’s strategy: Cutting the pitch in half

This is a key pressing principle not unique to Ange Postecoglou’s Spurs, but they have exemplified it when their high pressing has been on song. One of the worst things that can happen to a pressing team is being unable to commit, because the opposition has the time and options to play out down either side of the pitch. A big part of Spurs’ pressing strategy, usually set off by the arcing runs of Son Heung-min, is to stop the goalkeeper being able to pass down one flank.

In this example at Villa Park, Son has bent his run from out-to-in and is blocking the pass from Emi Martinez to Pau Torres. Martinez can only play to the right, which is the trigger for Spurs locking on to their men and forcing a throw-in. Once play is on one side, Spurs can leave a Villa shirt free on the opposite wing, knowing they have time to shuffle over if play is transferred.

Strengths: Furious tempo and intensity yields goals in bunches

Spurs have been one of the most aggressive pressing teams in the Premier League this season. No team has allowed fewer passes per defensive action and only Man City have won more high turnovers than Spurs. It is quite the transformation from last season, when Spurs sat on the edge of their box under Antonio Conte and hoped to absorb ever-growing pressure. Postecoglou has been helped by the fact Spurs have played just 35 matches in all competitions so far this season. Especially at home, Spurs have overwhelmed teams with squalls of pressure that have seen them score in bunches.

Weaknesses: High quality chances conceded

The way Spurs press and attack places huge strain on central defenders Cristian Romero and Micky van de Ven, who are asked to defend the width of the pitch. Unlike City or Arsenal, Spurs do not keep a full-back tucked around to make up a back three. Both full-backs fly forward, leaving space down the sides of Romero and Van de Ven and demanding repeated sprints from the pair. Tottenham have conceded more than double the expected goals of Arsenal, despite ranking highly in pressing metrics. If an opponent can avoid being pinned to one touchline, there is space to exploit down the opposite side as well as in behind a high line.